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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
,JOREPH OKAMURA,
Plain.tiff-Respondent,
vs.
'rlME INSURANCE COMPANY,
Def end ant-Appell ant.

Case No.
11659

BRIEF O,F RESP·ONDENT'
NATURE OF CASE
'l'his is an action by plaintiff, an insured member
of a group health and accident insurance policy wherein
tlil' Utah Association of Nurserymen was the group
holder, against defendant, the insurance carrier on said
policy, to recover expenses for hospitalization and medirnl treatment for illness after the policy was issued.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court, Honorable Stewart
\I. Iln11so11, sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of
tl11• trial, judgment ·was entered in favor of plaintiff and
c1g·aim;t defendant for the sum of $1,405.20 plus costs in
111(• .-;nm of $19.00.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the action of the lower
court affirmed in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff
and against defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is very little, if any, disagreement regarding
the facts of this case. Prior to the effective date of the
group insurance policy in question the plaintiff Joseph
Okamura and Richard D . .Martinez were partners doing
business through a corporation known as Garden Art,
Inc. The plaintiff and Mr. Martinez were members of thl·
Utah Association of Nurserymen and as such becamr
insured under a group insurance policy which the defendant Time Insurance Company negotiated by and
through its agents with said association. Said insurance
policy was introduced at the trial of this matter and
included herein and marked Exhibits P4 and P5. Said
policy provides coverage for losses arising from accidental injury or illness. The group policy was issued to
become effective June 1, 1967, and the premiums thereon
were to be paid quarterly, however, the terms of tlic
policy and the members' individual certificate provide
as follows:
''Consideration, term and renewal: This policy
is issued in consideration of the payment of the
premium in advance of the effective date, and
may be continued in force by payment of the
premiums within 31 days of any premium due
date.''
2

The initial payment for the coverage of both the
plaintiff and Mr. Martinez was paid by a check dated
April 25, 1967, drawn on Garden Art, Inc. by Mr. Martinez dated October 5, 1967 (PS) in the amount of $98.70
and mailed October 7, 1967, direct to the company in
:'.\rilwaukee, Wisconsin. The due date of the second quarterly premium was September 1, 1967; said check was
for deposit by the defendant on 11 October
19G7; ten days after the expiration of the 31 day grace
period, or 41 days after the due date.
The third quarterly payment on behalf of the plaintiff, in the amount of $71.85 (Pl) (excluding the portion
of the premium attributable to Martinez), was dated the
bth of February, 1968, and mailed on the 7th of Febnrnry, 1968, this check was stamped for deposit by the
company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on the 14th day of
11\·bruary, 1968: 44 days after the expiration of the 31
<lay grace period which was December 1, 1967, (R5, 20,
:i8, 72) ; the company thereafter by a letter dated the
20th of February, 1968, (D16), thanked the plaintiff for
the check and requested information regarding the policy
1111mber so the company could credit plaintiff's account
with the payment.
The plaintiff was not, in fact, notified that his policy
hacl hee11 cancelled until after receipt of a letter dated
F\•liruary 29, 1968, (D17) from the defendant company
on approximately March 4, 1968; this letter dated the
of February, 1968, (Dl7) contained a check in the
a111 qmt of $71.85 from the defendant to the Okamuras
1
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representing a refund of their premium payment and i 11 .
formed Mr. Okamura his policy had been cancelled De.
cember 1, 1967. This notification was received 95 day,
after the date of cancellation; 24 days after receipt of
the third quarterly premium by the company
. mailed hy.
2\lrs. Okamura; and 13 days after the letter wherein thP
company acknowledged receipt of the payment anrl
thanked the Okamuras for the same.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT CLEARLY INTENDED
BY ACCEPTING 0 VE RD U E PREMIUM
PAYMENTS TO CONTINUE PLAIN'l1IFF'S
INSURANCE COVERAGE.
As stated above, the first and only notice which Mr.
Okamura received regarding his policy coverage from
the company and the alleged cancellation thereof, was
by letter dated February 29, 1968, (D17), informing him
that he no longer had coverage and in fact tendering hark
his premium payment in the amount of $71.85. This letter
was received approximately on the 4th day of March,
1968, some 95 days after the date of the alleged cancclla
ti on of said policy; 24 days after the receipt by the com
pany of the premium check which was negotiated; and
13 days after the letter wherein the company acknowledged receipt of the payment from the Okamuras aml
thanked them for the same (D16).
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It is the general rule with respect to policies requiring tho periodical payment of premiums and providing
for a forfeiture for failing to pay on the day named,
that if the insurer customarily receives overdue premium payments from the insured and thereby induces
him to believe that a forfeiture will not be incurred by
a delay in the payment of premiums it cannot insist
011 a forfeiture for delay induced by such custom. 43
Am.Jur 2nd, Insurance, Section 1139 et. seq.

Generally speaking, in the absence of notice by the
insurer within a reasonable time before the time of
paymc>nt of an intention to discontinue a custom of
\\'Hi\'ing compliance with provisions as to payment, an
i11sma11ce company cannot avoid the effect of the custom
by a refusal to accept payment in accordance with the
rnstom. There is no dispute to the fact that Mr. Okamura
liad received no notice of the alleged cancellation after
the expiration of 31 day grace period to wit: 1 December,
191i7, until the letter dated February 29, 1968. The course
of custom which was established by the defendant company and its acceptance of the late quarterly payment
in October, 1967, which was due September 1, 1967, indnn•d the plaintiff to believe that he in fact was covered
hr insurance; the company had taken no affirmative
stpp:,; to inform .J\Ir. Okamura that his policy had been
(·nw·elled.
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A forfeiture for non-payment of premiums is not
favored in law, and courts are prompt to seize upon
circumstances which indicate an election to waive the
forfeiture. Since forfeitures are not favored, it has been
held that unless the circumstances show a clear intention to claim a forfeiture for non-payment of premium,
none ·will be enforced. Appleman, Insurance Law And
Practice, Volume 15, Section 8403 et. seq., Benatti 'L'S.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, (1937)
8 N. E. 2d 551, 290 Ill. App. 438. Any course of action
which leads the insured to believe that an extension has
been granted for the payment of premiums and that in
the meantime a forfeiture will not be incurred, constitutes a waiver. Trarelers Protectfre Association Of
America 1.:s. Jones CCA Fla. (1937), 91 F2d 337.
This Supreme Court in Cooper vs. Foresters Underwriters, Inc. 2 Utah 2d 373, 275 2d 675, 1954, reiteratNl
the Utah rule that an insurance company, which by any
course of conduct induces in the mind of an insured an
honest belief reasonably founded that strict compliance
with the stipulation in the contract for prompt payment
of premiums will not be insisted on, waives its right to
a forfeiture for non-payment of premiums.

POINT II
DEFENDANT WAIVED THE AUTOMATIC FORFEITURE PROVISION OF ITS
POLICY AND IS THEREBY ESTOPPED TO
ASSERT THE SAME.
In general, any act, declaration, or course of dealing hy the insurer with knowledge of the facts constituti11g a cause of forfeiture or a breach of a condition in the
poliey, which recognizes and treats the policy as still
in force, and leads the person insured to regard himself
as still protected, will amount to a waiver of the forfeiture provision; and will estop the insurer from insisting on the forfeiture or setting up the same as a defense
when sued for a subsequent loss. Moreover, slight acts
of an insurance company may constitute a waiver of technical defenses to liability on the policy. 43 AmJur 2nd,
Supra Section 1092 et. seq.
In Old Surety Life Insurance Company vs. Miller,
3:33 P.2d 504 (1958) (Okla), the court held that notwithanding the fact that the policy provided that it could
ht> reinstated after lapse upon the payment of premiums
due, plus evidence of insurability, the insurer by its past
ronduct in accepting reinstatements of the policy without
evidence of insurability was estopped from denying
conrage when the insured sent a premium to the com11n11y shortly before his death without furnishing evideuee of insurability.
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The court stated :

"In 20 Am. Jr. Insurwnce, Section 800, it is said:
'It is clear that a proYision for forf ei tu re or suspension of an insurance policy for non-payment
of premiums or assessments, or for a breach of
a condition or warranty, is inserted for the benefit of the insurer, and it may waive such a provision or be estopped to deny its breach * * * and it
may
a provision after, as well as before,
a f orf e1ture has occurred. * * * ' ''
See also Pacific Mutua,l Life Insurance Co. vs. McDowell,
141 Pac. 273 (Okla.), Continental Insurance Co. of N.Y.
vs. Hall, 137 P.2d 908.
And in Nels on vs. National Guaranty Life Co.
(1933), 131 Cal. 669, 21P.2d1022, the court held that an
insurer accepting payments late in previous months induced insured to believe late payments would be received
in discharge of installments, and therefore, waived provisions respecting forfeiture until specific notice was
given. See also Vinther vs. Simset Mut. Life Ins. Co.
(1936), 11 Cal. 118, 53 P.2d 182.
In the case at hand, the insurer made no effort
whatsoever to contact the plaintiff and notify him that
his coverage had been cancelled until ninety-five days
after the cancellation date of plaintiff's policy. The
company, in fact, negotiated plaintiff's check (P-1), and
1Jy letter dated February 20, 1968, acknowledged receipt
of the same and made no mention
of the alleged cancellation of said policy to plaintiff's prejudice.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that based on the actions
of the defendant insurer to wit: Complete failure to
notify the plaintiff that his coverage had been terminated; acceptance of the second quarterly payment some
forty-one days after the due date; and the acceptance
of the third quarterly payment forty-four days after the
l'Xpiration of the thirty-one day grace period; and subsequent confirmation of the receipt of the payment dated
February 20, 1968; a clear indication of defendant's intent to waive its forfeiture provision and continue
was evidenced.

Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
D. GARY CHRISTIAN and
J. DENNIS FREDERICK
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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